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COVID-19’s Impacts on the
Labor Market in 2020 
Brad J. Hershbein and Harry J. Holzer 
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS 
n COVID-19 decimated the
U.S. labor market in the spring 
of 2020; a partial recovery in 
the summer and early fall left 
historically marginalized and 
economically disadvantaged 
groups largely behind, more 
than in any previous recession.
n Blacks and Hispanics have
had slower employment
recoveries than whites, even
accounting for differences in
education and occupation.
n States hit harder by
COVID earlier on continue 
to lag behind in their 
employment recovery.
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It is no secret that in the spring of 2020 the 
COVID-19 pandemic disrupted U.S. labor markets 
more severely and more quickly than at any point 
in living memory. A blizzard of research papers, 
newspaper stories, and calls for economic relief 
have documented the severe crash in employment 
in the spring of 2020, and the disproportionate 
burden borne by workers in leisure and 
accommodation, workers of color, and workers 
unable to do their jobs remotely. Far less is known, 
however, about how employment trajectories 
have played out for diferent groups over the 
rest of 2020, as a nascent recovery frst gathered 
steam and then stalled, and how these patterns 
varied across states that difered in the timing 
and severity of their outbreaks and economic 
restrictions. 
In a recent working paper, we draw on publicly 
available data on detailed employment measures, 
COVID case rates and mortality, and state 
restriction policies to shed light on how labor 
markets have evolved since the pandemic began, 
capturing trends through the end of 2020. We fnd 
that the overall jobs recovery fatlined in October, 
as caseloads and mortality rose sharply, but that 
this aggregate pause obscured a continuation 
of slow gains among higher-paid workers and 
a second, if much milder, drop among lower-
paid workers. We also confrm that Blacks and 
Hispanics not only had larger initial employment 
losses in the spring, but that their employment 
recoveries lagged over the summer and early fall. 
Even when we control for diferences in education 
and type of occupation, these racial gaps persist, 
although by year’s end there was convergence for 
Blacks even as the gap for Hispanics began to grow 
again. Permanent job loss has also been higher 
among these groups. 
In addition to these disparities by race, we also 
fnd large and persistent disparities in employment 
trends across states. Grouping states into three 
categories based on when their caseloads frst 
peaked, we document that employment recoveries 
have lagged among states that had the earliest 
outbreaks, and that the share of their populations 
with permanent job loss has increased the most. 
Delving into the reasons for this dispersion, 
we show that while economic restrictions hurt 
Compared to prepandemic,
about 10 million more people
were jobless by December 2020,
and another 2 million had their
work hours reduced. 
employment when they are in place, their negative 
impact quickly fades once they are relaxed. Rather, 
elevated mortality rates depress employment not 
only contemporaneously but for months aferward, 
most likely because a greater number of deaths is a 
highly visible and persistent signal for the dangers 
of engaging in economic activity that drives both 
jobs and the risk of infection. Unfortunately, the 
rise in mortality rates that occurred at the end of 
2020 will likely create headwinds for continued 
employment recovery in 2021. 
To ofset these headwinds and increase the 
chances that the recovery is broad and inclusive, 
we propose a series of policies to provide fnancial 
assistance to the workers hit hardest by the 
pandemic and to help reskill workers whose 
jobs are unlikely to return. However, any robust 
recovery will require eforts to control the spread 
of the virus in the immediate future, including 
accelerated vaccination, more widespread and 
inexpensive testing, and increased incentives for 
mask wearing and physical distancing. 
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COVID-19’s Impacts on the Labor Market in 2020 
employment rate, suggesting that this 
employment rate is a good proxy for 
the strength of the labor market. 
The Rising Inequality Gap 
Tis overall recovery, anemic as 
it is, has not been felt equally by all 
workers. Te two panels in Figure 2 
break out trends by occupational wage 
quartile. Each quartile represents a 
fourth of workers based on the average 
hourly wage in their occupation, with 
1 being the lowest and 4 being the 
highest. Panel A shows the modifed 
employment rate, as in Figure 1. 
Although lower wage quartiles have 
always had lower employment rates, 
the gap surged afer the pandemic 
began. Te modifed employment rate 
of the frst wage quartile plummeted 
by an astonishing 35 percentage points 
between February and April, before 
rebounding about two-thirds of the 
way back by October. Workers in 
higher wage quartiles sufered much 
smaller losses, with those in the top 
quartile down only 2 percentage 
points from the beginning of 2020 
by year’s end, and those in the third 
quartile down 6 percentage points. 
While modifed employment rates 
continued to rise slightly between 
November and December for the top 
two wage quartiles, they reversed 
course and fell slightly for the bottom 
two quartiles. Tese losses occurred 
simultaneously with rising COVID 
caseloads and mortality and renewed 
economic restrictions, particularly in 
the hospitality and leisure sector, which 
has many low-paying occupations. 
Panel B in Figure 2 examines the 
share of the population who report 
sufering permanent job loss (that is, 
they lost a job and do not consider 
themselves on temporary layof). 
Research has found that such long-
term job separation predicts lower 
earnings and higher health risks even 
decades later (Ruhm 1991; Eliason and 
Storrie 2006; Sullivan and Von Wachter 
2009). In winter 2020, these shares 
clustered around half a percent for all 
Figure 1  Labor Market Indicators over 2020 
80% 5.75 
worked by people during the reference week of the survey. 
SOURCE: Current Population Survey; authors’ calculations. 
2020 Labor Market Trends 
Figure 1 presents three indicators of 
aggregate employment over the course 
of 2020. Te red line with circles shows 
the employment rate of people aged 
18–64—the share of these people with 
jobs—although we have adjusted this 
number slightly to exclude individuals 
who reported being absent from work 
for unspecifed reasons. (Te U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics believes 
many of this latter group should have 
been classifed as unemployed instead.) 
Starting above 75 percent prior to the 
pandemic, the employment rate dips 
in March before plummeting over 13 
percentage points in April, gradually 
recovering to 71 percent by October 
and budging little over the next two 
months. Nearly 10 million fewer 
Americans had a job in December than 
in February 2020. 
However, this doesn’t capture the 
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NOTE: The employment rate is the share of non-institutionalized civilians aged 18–64 who report being employed, 
except for those who report being absent from work for unspecifed reasons (many of whom are believed by the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics to have been misclassifed and are actually unemployed). The modifed employment rate 
excludes individuals who report being employed part-time involuntarily. Total weekly hours is the sum of all hours 
many workers have kept their jobs but 
had their hours reduced involuntarily. 
Tus, the blue line with squares 
presents a modifed employment 
rate that excludes individuals who 
are involuntarily part time. Te gap 
between this measure of employment 
and the frst one is 1.5 percentage 
points in January and February, but 
it widens substantially by April to 
4.7 percentage points, and even in 
December is still 2.6 percentage points. 
Tis means that, in addition to the 
approximately 10 million fewer people 
without a job, another 2 million are 
employed but working fewer hours 
than before the pandemic. Finally, 
the dashed black line shows the total 
number of hours worked per week 
across all Americans. Tis metric 
has fallen from 5.6 billion in early 
2020 to 5.15 billion as of December, a 
decline of 8.4 percent, about the same 
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wage quartiles. Tey rose sharply and 
diverged, particularly over the summer 
and fall, with the share peaking at 3.2 
percent in October for the bottom 
quartile. Te slight dips seen in 
December are not necessarily good 
news—because modifed employment 
rates also fell for the bottom quartiles 
(panel A), it’s likely that workers in the 
bottom quartile were leaving the labor 
force entirely rather than fnding a new 
job. 
Recovery Lags for Black and 
Hispanic Workers 
Te recovery in the modifed 
employment rate has also varied 
considerably by race and ethnicity. 
Te solid red and blue lines in Figure 
3 show the change in the employment 
rate, in percentage points, for Blacks 
and Hispanics since January 2020. 
Hispanics initially fare the worst, 
but Blacks also sufer greater initial 
losses than other racial groups (solid 
gray line). Hispanics have also had a 
faster recovery, at least into the fall. By 
December, racial gaps had narrowed, 
especially for Blacks, although there 
was some slippage for Hispanics. 
Some of these racial gaps may be 
due to education and occupational 
diferences. Tus, in the dashed lines, 
we statistically control for these 
diferences. Tis reduces the gap 
substantially between Blacks and 
everyone else in the spring and early 
summer, but plays a somewhat smaller 
role aferward. Tese adjustments make 
less of a diference for the gap with 
Hispanics. Tus, not only have Blacks 
and Hispanics had larger employment 
losses and slower recoveries, the 
bulk of these disparities—especially 
for Hispanics—cannot be explained 
by educational and occupational 
diferences. 
The Role of COVID Mortality and 
Economic Restrictions 
Employment rate losses and 
recoveries also difer across states. We 
fnd, for example, that states that had 
Figure 2   The Bottom Wage Quartile Has Had a Much Weaker Recovery Than the Top Quartile 
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NOTE: See note to Figure 1 for the defnition of the modifed employment rate. The permanent job loser share is the 
share of the population (not just the unemployed) who report having lost a job and do not expect to be recalled. 
The (hourly) wage quartiles are based on detailed occupation from Occupational Employment Statistics and are 
population weighted; Q1 thus represents the bottom quarter of workers in terms of hourly pay, while Q4 represents 
the top quarter. 
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COVID-19’s Impacts on the Labor Market in 2020 
Figure 3  Blacks and Hispanics Have Experienced Slower Employment Rate Recoveries, Even after 


















NOTE: See note to Figure 1 for the defnition of the modifed employment rate. Light, solid lines show the change, in 
percentage points, of the modifed employment rate since January 2020 for each racial group. The darker, dashed lines 
control for worker education and occupational wage quartile. 
SOURCE: Current Population Survey; Occupational Employment Statistics; authors’ calculations. 
initial COVID-19 caseload peaks in when there are fewer restrictions. 
the spring of 2020—the well-known However, we also fnd that there 
New York and New Jersey, but also are no lingering efects of economic 
Minnesota, Virginia, and Colorado— restrictions; once these are relaxed, 
had deeper declines and less robust the employment rate bounces back. 
recoveries than states that reached On the other hand, we do fnd an 
their frst caseload peak only in the fall, accumulating impact of COVID 
such as New Hampshire, Wisconsin, mortality (but not caseloads) on 
and Oregon. A key question is how employment rates. By December, a 
COVID caseload and mortality state with 100 more total deaths per 
rates, as well as state restrictions on 100,000 people—about the diference 
economic activity—including stay- between the 90th percentile (Rhode 
at-home orders and bans on indoor Island; 131.8 deaths per 100,000 
dining, among others—have afected people) and the 10th percentile (Utah; 
employment. Using regression analysis, 28.6 deaths per 100,000)—would be 
we fnd that current case rates are expected to have an employment rate 
positively associated with employment, 3 percentage points lower, everything 
while current mortality rates and else equal. Te surge in mortality rates 
the severity of current economic that occurred nationwide in November 
restrictions reduce employment rates. 2020 through January 2021 thus could 
Tis likely refects the short-run trade- pose a looming threat to continued 
of between heightened economic economic recovery in 2021. 
activity and greater virus transmission 
Conclusion 
Te labor market recovery from 
the COVID-19 recession was brief 
and uneven in 2020, leaving behind 
workers disadvantaged by race, 
ethnicity, and economic status. As 
cases ebb and fow around the country, 
states that have sufered—or will 
sufer—numerous COVID deaths 
may experience a slower recovery 
through 2021. An equitable and 
broad economic recovery will need 
a rapid and comprehensive vaccine 
rollout, but we argue in the paper
for several additional policies to 
spur employment. Tese should 
include fscal relief for state and local 
governments to stave of further cuts, 
wage insurance programs for those 
who struggle to fnd new jobs, and 
enhanced funding for sectoral training 
and community college education for 
industries and occupations that will 
continue to grow, such as construction, 
health care, and IT. 
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Te Child and Dependent Care 
Credit (CDCC), a tax credit based 
on income and child care expenses, 
subsidizes child care costs for working 
families. Te federal CDCC is available 
to households with children younger 
than 13 in which all parents have 
positive annual earnings. While many 
families meet these criteria, from its 
introduction in 1976 through 2020, 
the CDCC was nonrefundable, so 
only families with positive tax liability 
afer other deductions benefted. Tis 
generally precluded very-low-income 
families from receiving CDCC benefts, 
and many policymakers advocated 
making the credit refundable. In 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic, 
the American Rescue Plan Act of 
2021 made the CDCC refundable and 
increased its generosity during tax 
year 2021 only. I estimate how CDCC 
eligibility, benefts, and marginal tax 
rates would change for diferent groups 
if the credit were made permanently
refundable. 
Using data from the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation, 
which documents income, 
demographics, and child care expenses 
of U.S. households, I fnd that making 
the CDCC permanently refundable 
would lead to relatively large increases 
in eligibility among single-parent, 
Black, and Hispanic households, 
which are all less likely to qualify for 
the nonrefundable credit. Specifcally, 
some 3 percent of Black households, 2 
percent of Hispanic households, and 
1 percent of white households would 
gain eligibility, all else equal. About 
5 percent of single parents would 
gain eligibility and receive on average 
over $1,000 in benefts annually. Tis 
increase is substantial, constituting 
18 percent of existing child care 
spending and 10 percent of adjusted 
gross income (AGI). Nevertheless, 
refundability would generate small 
increases in marginal tax rates for some 
moderate-income taxpayers. Making 
the CDCC permanently refundable 
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS 
n The Child and Dependent Care Credit (CDCC) subsidizes child care costs for work-
ing families.
n In 2021, the CDCC was made temporarily refundable, so even families with no 
positive tax liability after other deductions could benefit.
n If refundability were made permanent, around 5 percent of single parents would 
gain eligibility and receive on average over $1,000 per year in benefits.
n Permanent refundability would also lead to large increases in eligibility among 
Black and Hispanic households.
n Some moderate-income taxpayers would experience small increases in marginal 
tax rates.
would increase government spending 
each year by about $800 million, or 21 
percent of CDCC spending during the 
late 2010s. 
How Does the CDCC Work? 
Congress implemented the CDCC 
in 1976 and expanded it in 1981 and 
2001. Te latter expansion took efect 
in 2003, and between 2003 and 2020, 
households were able to claim up to 
$3,000 worth of child care expenses 
per year for each of up to two children 
younger than 13. Such households 
could receive a tax credit worth up to 
If the CDCC were made
permanently refundable,
low-income taxpayers would
receive larger benefts. 
35 percent of those expenses, up to 
$1,050 per child. Beginning at $15,000 
in AGI, the beneft rate decreased by 
1 percentage point for each additional 
$2,000 until it remained at 20 percent 
for those with $43,000 or more in AGI, 
who could receive up to $600 per child 
in benefts. Te CDCC, however, was 
nonrefundable, so taxpayers without 
positive tax liability were ineligible. 
Moreover, CDCC claimants must 
work to qualify for benefts, including 
both spouses among married taxpayers 
fling jointly. Additionally, if either 
spouse’s earnings are less than child 
care expenditures, the CDCC is capped 
by the pay of the lower-earning spouse. 
Almost any child care expenditures 
are eligible for the credit, except care 
provided by a noncustodial parent, 
but to claim the credit, taxpayers 
must list their earnings, child care 
expenditures, and child care providers’ 
tax identifcation or Social Security 
numbers. 
How Would Permanent Refundability 
Afect CDCC Eligibility and Benefts? 
Nonrefundability generates a 
diference between statutory and 
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Making the Child Care Tax Credit Permanently Refundable Could Beneft Low-Income Families 
actual benefts received. In Figure 
1, I compare maximum efective 
CDCC benefts with and without 
refundability as of 2020.1 Taxpayers’ 
incomes must exceed the tax fling 
threshold of $18,650 to be eligible for 
nonrefundable benefts. For taxpayers 
with incomes above this threshold, 
nonrefundable benefts (red lines) 
increase with income before reaching 
peaks of about $860 at $27,600 in 
AGI for households with one eligible 
child and $1,530 at $34,100 in AGI for 
households with two or more eligible 
children. Benefts then decrease until 
they plateau at $600 per child for 
taxpayers with $43,000 or more in 
income. 
Figure 1 also shows that if the 
CDCC were made permanently 
refundable (blue lines), low-income 
taxpayers would receive larger benefts. 
For very-low-income taxpayers, 
refundable benefts increase as income 
increases and then hold steady at 
$1,050 per child at incomes up to 
$15,000. For taxpayers with AGI 
above $15,000, refundable benefts 
steadily fall as income increases until 
they converge with nonrefundable 
benefts. Hence, making the CDCC 
permanently refundable would 
increase generosity among low-income 
taxpayers without afecting benefts for 
those with higher incomes. 
How Would Permanent Refundability 
Afect Work Decisions? 
As a subsidy for child care, 
CDCC benefts encourage child care 
spending and efectively increase 
wages net of child care costs. Since all 
parents must work to receive benefts, 
increases in benefts promote labor 
force participation. However, the 
CDCC generates complex work hours 
incentives. To examine how making the 
CDCC permanently refundable would 
afect work hours, I compare marginal 
tax rates with respect to income—the 
taxes that parents would owe on an 
additional dollar of income—with 







Federal AGI ($000s) 
NOTE: The fgure shows expected federal CDCC benefts for households with one (dashed line) or two or more 
(solid line) eligible children as of 2020. The maximum credit with refundability is shown in blue and without 
refundability is shown in red. 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using federal tax forms. 
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and without refundability. When 
marginal tax rates increase, the value 
of an additional dollar of earnings 
falls, which discourages parents from 
working more. 
Figure 2 displays these marginal 
tax rates for households with the 
maximum qualifying child care 
expenditures as of 2020.2 Panel A, 
which shows marginal tax rates for 
single parents with one eligible child, 
indicates that making the CDCC 
permanently refundable would 
decrease marginal tax rates by 35 
percentage points for those with less 
than $3,000 in AGI. (Marginal tax 
rates are already negative in this range, 
implying that an additional dollar of 
earnings is worth more than a dollar 
because of the credit.) Refundability 
would not afect marginal tax rates 
for single parents between incomes 
of $3,000 and $15,000, but it would 
increase rates by 1.5 percentage points 
between incomes of $15,000 and 
$25,000 and by 11.5 percentage points 
between incomes of $25,000 and 
$33,000. 
Marginal tax rates for married 
parents with two eligible children, 
depicted in Panel B of Figure 2, exhibit 
a similar pattern. Tus, a permanently 
refundable CDCC would reduce 
marginal tax rates for households 
with very low incomes, incentivizing 
increases in their work hours, but 
it would increase marginal tax rates 
for households with low to moderate 
incomes, discouraging their work 
hours. 
How Would Permanent Refundability 
Afect Diferent Families? 
As refundability has diferent 
impacts on tax rates across the 
income distribution, which 
households would likely beneft from 
a permanently refundable CDCC? 
To answer the question, I simulate 
impacts of refundability, drawing 
on the 2018 Survey of Income and 
Program Participation for taxpayer 
characteristics and child care spending 
EMPLOYMENT RESEARCH  • APRIL 2021 W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE 
among households with children 
younger than 13. Te data allow me 
to estimate CDCC eligibility rates by 
family structure and race and observe 
how permanent refundability would 
afect CDCC benefts and marginal 
tax rates across households that face 
diferent child care and labor supply 
incentives. 
I fnd that 15 percent of single 
parents and 19 percent of married 
parents are eligible for nonrefundable 
CDCC benefts. About 5 percent of 
single parents have incomes too low to 
qualify for the nonrefundable benefts 
but would become eligible if the credit 
were made permanently refundable. 
Another 56 percent of single parents 
would gain eligibility if refundability 
led them to pay for child care. Te 
remaining 25 percent of single parents 
low to qualify for the nonrefundable 
CDCC but would become eligible if 
refundability led them to pay for child 
care. Tese results suggest permanent 
CDCC refundability would decrease 
eligibility gaps between whites and 
underrepresented groups. 
Permanent refundability would also 
change beneft amounts for diferent 
families. Among single parents who 
work and already pay for child care, 
23 percent are ineligible for the 
nonrefundable CDCC, another 23 
percent fall in the phase-in region of 
the CDCC, where benefts increase as 
income rises, and the remaining 54 
percent fall in the phase-out/plateau 
region of the credit, where benefts 
decrease or remain constant as income 
rises. Households in the ineligible and 
phase-in regions on average spend 
about $6,000 and $11,000 per year, 
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do not work and have incomes too 
low to qualify for the nonrefundable 
CDCC. Among married parents, 
10 percent have incomes too low to 
qualify for the nonrefundable CDCC, 




pay for child care and therefore would 
remain ineligible under a refundable -60 
credit. Most married parents are 
ineligible for the CDCC because they 
do not pay for child care or one of the -80 
parents does not work. 
CDCC eligibility rates also vary 60% 
by parents’ race and ethnicity. Black 
and Hispanic households, which tend 40% 
to have lower incomes, are less likely 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Federal AGI ($000s) 
Nonrefundable CDCC Refundable CDCC 
NOTE: The fgure shows marginal tax rates with respect to AGI under the federal CDCC, Child Tax Credit, Earned 
Income Tax Credit, and federal individual income tax schedule as of 2020, assuming the CDCC is nonrefundable 
or refundable. 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using TAXSIM and federal tax forms. 
20% than white households to be eligible for 
the nonrefundable CDCC. Whereas 
0%21 percent of white households are 
eligible, only 17 percent of Black 
-20 households and 13 percent of Hispanic 
households are eligible. Making the 
-40 CDCC permanently refundable 
would increase eligibility by about 
3 percentage points among Black -60 
households, by about 2 percentage 
points among Hispanic households, -80 
and by about 1 percentage point among 
white households. Another 14 percent 
of Black households, 8 percent of 
Hispanic households, and 7 percent 
of white households have incomes too 
7 
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respectively, on child care. If the CDCC 
were made permanently refundable, 
average annual benefts would increase 
from $0 to $1,037 in the ineligible 
region and from $617 to $1,249 in the 
phase-in region. Tese increases are 
substantial: in the ineligible region, 
the increase constitutes 18 percent of 
existing child care spending and 10 
percent of AGI. In the phase-in region, 
it constitutes 6 percent of child care 
spending and 3 percent of AGI. 
Tese beneft increases also afect 
marginal tax rates. In the ineligible 
region, the average marginal tax rate 
on an additional dollar of income 
would fall by 5 percentage points under 
refundability, while in the phase-in 
and phase-out/plateau regions it would 
rise by about 2 percentage points. 
However, the benefts also subsidize 
the cost of child care, efectively 
making it cheaper. For households 
in the ineligible region, the efective 
(postsubsidy) cost of an additional 
dollar of child care spending decreases 
by 16 percent. In the phase-in and 
phase-out/plateau regions, the cost 
decreases by 9 and 4 cents on the 
dollar, respectively. Tus, moderate-
income households have slightly higher 
marginal tax rates on their incomes 
ofset by cheaper child care costs, with 
the latter possibly mitigating work 
disincentives caused by the former. 
How Would Permanent Refundability 
Afect Government Spending? 
Finally, CDCC beneft increases 
under refundability would increase 
government spending. If all households 
with beneft increases were to claim 
the CDCC, making it permanently 
refundable would increase government 
spending annually by about $800 
million, or about 22 percent of total 
CDCC spending in the late 2010s. 
Notes 
1. I assume single taxpayers fle as head-of-
household, married taxpayers fle jointly, 
and all income comes from earnings among 
very-low-income taxpayers. 
2. I assume households do not have older 
children, all income comes from earnings, 
and married parents have equal earnings, 
though results are similar for married 
parents with unequal earnings. 
For additional details, see the working 
paper at https://research.upjohn.org/ 
up_workingpapers/344. 
Gabrielle Pepin is a postdoctoral researcher at the
Upjohn Institute. 
Inviting Submissions for the 2021 Dissertation Award 
Te W.E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research invites 
submissions for its 27th annual prize 
for the best PhD dissertation on 
employment-related issues. 
A frst prize of $2,500 is being 
ofered. Up to two honorable mention 
awards of $1,000 may also be given. 
Te Institute supports and conducts 
policy-relevant research on issues 
related to employment, unemployment, 
and social insurance programs. Te 
dissertation award furthers this 
mission. Te dissertation may come 
from any academic discipline, but it 
must have a substantial policy focus. 
Dissertations will be evaluated by a 
panel of economists using the following 
criteria: 
• Policy relevance 
• Technical quality of the research 
• Presentation 
Any person whose dissertation has 
been accepted during the 24-month 
period from July 1, 2019 to June 30, 
2021 is eligible for the 2021 prize. 
Te deadline for submission is July 
5, 2021. Applicants must upload a 10-
page summary of the dissertation, CV, 
and a letter of endorsement from their 
dissertation advisor at: https://www
.upjohn.org/form/dissertation-award. 
Applicants are advised that they will 
need to supply a copy of their entire 
dissertation if they are selected as a 
fnalist, and they may apply for the 
award only once. 
Additional information may 
be obtained by contacting us at 
communications@upjohn.org. 




dissertation_awards/ for a complete list 
of award winners and summaries of 
their dissertations. 
Recent Winners 2020 
First Prize 
Claire Montialoux 
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W.E. Upjohn Institute Welcomes Beth Truesdale 
Te Upjohn Institute is excited to 
announce that Beth C. Truesdale will be 
joining its research team this summer. 
Currently a research associate at 
the Harvard Center for Population and 
Development Studies, Truesdale is a 
Connect with us 
sociologist specializing in issues of income 
inequality and how the changing nature 
of work afects worker wellbeing and 
retirement decisions. A Rhodes Scholar, 
Truesdale earned bachelor’s and master’s 
degrees from the University of Oxford before 
earning her doctorate in sociology from 
Harvard University. 
Upjohn Institute President Michael 
Horrigan lauded the expertise and 
perspective Truesdale brings to the Institute. 
“Her focal areas and her experience with 
case studies, ethnographic research, and 
public policy make Beth a wonderful 
complement to other Institute researchers 
and will help us serve our mission of 
promoting employment strategies and good 
jobs for all,” Horrigan said. 
WEBSITE
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Employment Research @UpjohnInstitute 
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